Are Our Moral Beliefs Fully Determined by Evolution? a Response to Richard Joyce.
In the Evolution of Morality, Richard Joyce examines the nature of our moral sense through a genealogical account and seeks to determine if we are justified in holding moral beliefs after learning more about their etiology. Joyce’s so-called evolutionary “debunking” of morality occurs in the last chapter of his book, and it concludes that we, given our evolutionary and genealogical history, ought to “cultivate agnosticism regarding all positive beliefs” involving moral concepts until evidence is found in favor of or against the belief.
It is my goal here to argue that, although we may yet have reason to cultivate agnosticism—or even be immensely, radically skeptical about moral beliefs—Joyce’s argument does not give us reason to do so.
More specifically, after outlining in greater detail the relevant parts of Joyce’s argument, I will, through posing a particular objection, attempt to show that Joyce’s debunking theory via his “belief pill” analogy ought not persuade us to embrace a radical skepticism, as he does not show how the influences of his contrived genealogy of our evolved moral sense determine a genealogy of our moral beliefs.
That is, it seems that there is still room in Joyce’s system for moral facts to influence a genealogical account of moral beliefs in way that both is different from that of our moral sense and allows us escape the agnosticism Joyce claims is rational to maintain; in which case, it may be yet reasonable to hold positive beliefs as they are not proven fully determined.
I then consider a possible (and what I take to be a very strong) response from Joyce to my objection and thereafter the consequences of such a response.
I. JOYCE’S ARGUMENT
It would benefit this discussion to outline Joyce’s main argument in chapter 6 of his work. Joyce begins by presenting to his reader a thought experiment surrounding the hypothetical use of what he calls “belief pills.” These belief pills instill particular beliefs you may not otherwise have held. He uses the belief that Napoleon lost at Waterloo as an example. Once the pill is administered, you believe Napoleon did, in fact, lose at Waterloo.
Joyce then asks us to suppose we discovered that this belief pill had been administered to us.
This discovery, Joyce says, “should undermine our faith in the belief” about Napoleon. We ought not be certain that Napoleon lost at Waterloo until we administered ourselves the antidote and sought out evidence for or against the belief. Until then, we should be agnostic about the belief.
For Joyce, this thought experiment serves as an analogy for our moral beliefs.
Just as discovering our belief that Napoleon lost at Waterloo stemmed from a causal process that was not determined by evidence—the belief pill—cultivated agnosticism about that belief, so too should we cultivate this agnosticism when discovering our moral beliefs are caused by an evolutionary process that is not determined by (moral) facts.
Namely, the evolutionary process of natural selection.
This non-moral cause of—and its influence on—our moral sense and its development is reason enough to take the antidote, says Joyce. That is, it is enough to cultivate agnosticism about all positive claims about the moral belief.
If we wanted to place this part of his argument in premise-conclusion form for clarity, we may outline it as follows:
P(1): We have an evolutionary history that contains a genealogy of moral sense that was shaped by a non-moral cause (in that does not make reference to any facts about morality); namely, natural selection.
P(2): Moreover and given this evolutionary history, the beliefs about moral facts have been fully determined by the evolutionary influence of natural selection.
— — —
C: Therefore, because of this influence, we have no reason to form positive moral beliefs nor think the ones we do form are correct.
I will now pose my objection to Joyce. I will attempt to show that, although we may have reason to be agnostic about our moral beliefs, Joyce’s argument should not convince us, as it is not evident that the content of our moral beliefs be fully determined through his argument.
II. THE PARTICULAR GENEALOGICAL OBJECTION
It is clear from this argument that Joyce has not shown us how it is, exactly, that this discovery of natural selection with regard to the development of our moral sense ought to undermine our reason to think there are moral facts and, more importantly, consider our beliefs about them to be fully determined. More precisely, it does not follow that given a non-moral cause of an evolutionarily adapted moral sense or capacity to hold beliefs, our beliefs are fully determined by that same influence.
Even if it is the case that the existence of our beliefs is parasitic on our capacity to hold them (that our moral sense provides), it does not fully remove the possibility that a separate and later genealogical account of those beliefs account for moral facts. Another way, the use of the capacity influenced and fully determined does not cause, necessarily, that the beliefs held by way of that capacity be also fully determined; although, they likely are, to some extent at least, somewhat determined.
The point is we cannot conclude they are fully or even mostly determined based upon the given premises.
Indeed, it seems plausible to think that this seperate genealogical account could have occured and developed tangentially to the moral sense, after its own development through natural selection.
It seems that it is also remains plausible, within Joyce’s system, that our moral beliefs may have been developed through an entirely separate process; perhaps a type of moral edification — one that references, or even teaches how to access and reference, moral facts. That is, through a separate or noticeably distinct genealogical track, moral facts can be discovered and thereby allow us to form beliefs representative—or in significant accordance with—those very same facts, in which case agnosticism would not be a reasonable position to hold.
What this distinctness between a genealogy of capacity (moral sense) and a genealogy of use (moral beliefs) could look like is something of its own important project. However, what I will offer is that I take the plausible distinctness between the two genealogies to follow the standard indiscernibility of identicals threshold of there being at least one thing that is true of A that is not true of B or visa-versa; that is, the genealogy of our moral beliefs is distinct from the genealogy of our moral sense if at least one thing about the genealogy of our moral beliefs is true of itself and not true of the genealogy of our moral sense.
What exactly might be true of the former but not the latter could be a number of things. It could be true for the genealogy of our moral beliefs that they began at a point later than the genealogy of our moral sense — thus making it true that one began at a point in time that the other did not. This would satisfy the definition of distinctness and would make the genealogy of our moral beliefs distinct from that of our moral sense, thus disallowing conflation of the two terms as Joyce at times does. Of course, the thing true about one and not the other could be more substantial, and deal with the differences in the nature of the genealogies themselves; however, this is all I shall offer on the notion of distinctness here, as it is beyond the scope of this essay.
Importantly, I am not endorsing this view, but merely attempting to display the remaining plausibility of not-fully-determined moral beliefs contra Joyce’s claiming otherwise.
If one is not convinced by my objection, let her consider an analogous case.
Consider, for example, our capacity to understand precise abstract concepts such as numbers. Now consider the ability with which we use this capacity to grasp numbers to perform measurements, analyze astronomical phenomena, discover Euclidean space, sum, and perform predicate calculus.
If it were at this very moment discovered that this capacity is a result of natural selection due to, say, ability to count the number of predatorial lions in an effort to know when one is safe (as Philip Kitcher suggests in a memorable example) as it would likely be better for survival, would we say that we ought to be agnostic about all measurements and mathematical calculation we have made with this capacity? Obviously not.
The summation of 2+ 2 = 4 and mathematics qua mathematics is not “debunked” on the basis of this capacity being influenced by the evolutionary process of natural selection. Similarly, our held moral beliefs are not “debunked” on the basis of the moral sense being influenced by evolution through natural selection,
It is possible that Joyce may respond by claiming the mathematical case is really not analogous to the moral one; that my example is an unfair analogy. However, this objection is unfounded and does nothing to his purpose.
Of course I am not arguing that mathematical beliefs are perfectly analogous in quality, what they predicate, or their respective qualia. Merely note that I am using mathematics somewhat arbitrarily and one will find this objection absurd; that is, I could have substituted numerous concepts or branches of knowledge for my analogy. This fact lends itself in the main to my point of criticism! My criticism was aimed at the logical structure of the argument, and the consequences of its premises.
In a word, my criticism wants to show that Joyce’s argument overgeneralizes.
If Joyce were to somehow reject the mathematical example on the basis of structural analogousness, he would have to explain where exactly it went wrong. It seems that the structures of the cases are identical in that they both stem from an external, evolutionarily influenced capacity and thereby — using Joyce’s premises — infer that the use of the capacity to form beliefs within it form beliefs that are fully determined by the same influence.
Viz., Joyce’s claim and my example follow the same tract: the formation of a moral or mathematical belief within their respective capacities through mental exercise within those capacities (a priori reasoning, deduction, induction, analysis, synthesis intuition, etc.) would merely result in evolutionarily determined beliefs, thus making it rational to cultivate agnosticism about our respective beliefs.
In one case we ought to be agnostic about moral beliefs, in another, mathematical beliefs — but these could be replaced with beliefs about drama, honor, etc. The cases line up perfectly insofar as the argument runs from — from a level of high altitude — an-influenced-capacity to influenced-beliefs-within-the-capacity. More exactly, the analogy follows the premises outlined by Joyce’s argument while merely replacing “moral” capacities and beliefs for “mathematical” ones. Indeed, the analogy follows Joyce’s argument structure and its consequences precisely.
Thus, to clarify how this part of my argument works, my aim is to criticise the logical structure of Joyce’s argument and show how, given what he has laid out and claimed, his argument overgeneralizes to include within it nearly all beliefs about almost all concepts that make reference to their relevant facts. This is, I suspect, something very few, including Joyce, would like to sign their name onto.
III. A POSSIBLE RESPONSE FROM JOYCE THROUGH STREET
Joyce may be tempted to object to my argument claiming that in fact the moral sense’s being influenced thereby corrupts our beliefs about moral facts, as the corrupted capacity provides that the use of tools within that capacity are also corrupted. This line of argument might take the form of something found in Sharon Street’s “Darwinian Dilemma”.
In her essay A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value, Street presents both horns of her dilemma to the moral realist and goes on to fend off various objections and solutions that the realist could potentially respond with.
In one particular section, Street fends off the objection that corrective measures of human reflection could be used to negate the evolutionary corruption of our ability to make reference to moral facts and our moral beliefs, in which she writes:
“Thus, if the find of evaluative judgements with which human reflection began was thoroughly contaminated with illegitimate influence and the objector has offered no reason to doubt this part of the argument then the tools of rational reflection were equally contaminated, for the latter are always just a subset of the former.”
Joyce could perhaps similarly argue against my objection, claiming that the moral beliefs with which we hold about the moral facts are as fully determined as the capacity to hold them through our moral sense is; since, it would seem to be the case that the exercise (“the holding”) of our moral beliefs is rooted in the evolutionarily determined capacity.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS RESPONSE
I should note that I used Street’s objection specifically here as I find it the most compelling response Joyce could potentially pose to my objection.
It seems, however, that while Street’s use of the claim that contamination of our genealogy ultimately also contaminates our ability to comb through our beliefs is at least somewhat plausible (within the context of her argument), for Joyce it manifests a new kind of dilemma, one in which he: (i.) must admit that our moral beliefs are not fully or mostly determined by an evolutionarily influenced moral sense or (ii.) widen the scope of his claim such that he must argue that all our concepts themselves are evolutionarily influenced and thus determined.
That is, he must undercut his argument thoroughly or accept a claim no philosopher (including, I presume, Joyce) has up to present wished to commit himself to.
To begin, consider the first issue (i.).
This arises by not responding in Street’s fashion outlined above and thus grants that the genealogical account of our moral sense does not affect or contaminate our moral beliefs.
If they do not contaminate our beliefs, then Joyce is yet without an explanation of how the genealogical influence of evolution on our moral sense determines our beliefs, causing his prescribed agnosticism to be unfounded. This is, quite obviously, something Joyce would not wish to do as it removes all or most of the force of his argument.
If he were to otherwise use Street’s claim (option ii.) and apply it in response to my objection, his issues become twofold. First, if it is the case — as this particular objection contends — that the genealogy of our moral sense does truly contaminate the moral beliefs we hold such that we can not reliably comb through them to determine facticity or any other desirable quality, it seems we would not even be able to comprehend the notion of the concepts maintained and entailed by the sense.
It seems Joyce would suggest this latter option is correct.
He writes:
“Suppose that the imaginary belief pills do not generate particular propositional beliefs, but rather dispose you to form a belief about a particular concept — a concept that wouldn’t figure in your beliefs. Thus, instead of a belief pill that makes you believe Napoleon lost at Waterloo, it’s just a ‘Napoleon’ pill that makes you form beliefs about Napoleon in general.”
If you were to find out this pill was administered, like that of the propositional belief pill analogy, Joyce claims it ought to undermine all your beliefs concerning Napoleon.
This is a much stronger claim (and one reminiscent of Street’s discussion of the second horn of her dilemma) that seems, put charitably, to attend to far too much.
This is an even stronger claim than what was outlined in § 2, as it accounts for all beliefs about the relevant facts about all concepts (respectively) and the tools those concepts contain. It seems that by this principle, evolution could account — and thereby contaminate and fully determine — for all concepts in which we have a cognitive capacity or sense that allows them; e.g., mathematics (at least geometric and algebraic concepts), logics, physics, and even general particular concepts.
It is clearly implausible to suggest that we ought to be agnostic about everything conceptual; even a Pyrrhonian skeptic would not traverse that much ground.
Joyce, then — to reiterate — seems to have to either concede his position or accept a claim that would leave us with nothing outside the scope of the agnostic, both of which I presume Joyce has no intention of doing.
Moreover, there is a less subtle reason to yet reject this kind of response: the use of the contamination principle still does not either acknowledge or dispel the possibility of a separate genealogy.
That is, claiming the corruption of the use of tools within a corrupted capacity does not describe how the corruption is transferred (for propositional belief or concepts!). Although the genealogy of our beliefs may find its roots in (or be contingent upon) our naturally selected moral sense, this fact alone does not say how this impacts the beliefs we hold.
It is likely the case that the influence upon our moral sense has somehow impacted which beliefs we tend to be attracted to — and Joyce’s argument seems to suggest this; however, it is, as far as Joyce’s argument takes us, implausible to conclude with any certainty that these moral beliefs have been fully determined by his genealogical account of the moral sense.
Although the genealogy of our beliefs may find its roots in (or be contingent upon) our naturally selected moral sense, this fact alone does not say how this impacts the beliefs we hold. It is likely the case that the influence upon our moral sense has somehow impacted which beliefs we tend to be attracted to — and Joyce’s argument seems to suggest this; however, it is, as far as Joyce’s argument takes us, implausible to conclude with any certainty that these moral beliefs have been fully determined by his genealogical account of the moral sense.
Now, after considering a criticism by analogy and an objection in § 2, an objection to my own objection through the use of Sharon Street’s work in § 3, a dilemma faced by Joyce, and the various consequences of his potential responses in § 4, I shall offer a brief word in conclusion.
VI. A WORD IN CONCLUSION
I have above outlined Joyce’s argument as charitably as possible and posed what I take to be a serious flaw in Joyce’s argument (or, more precisely, his logical structure and conclusion). I have attempted, through what I take to be a serious objection to his claim, to show the issues with his ability to defend the claim as it is subject to losing its force or inadvertently overgeneralizing.
Although it stands to reason that we may yet have reasons to cultivate an agnosticism about our moral beliefs, it seems that the case for this as a complete moral “debunking” was not realized through Joyce, who needs to do more work explaining the relation of possibly distinct genealogies if he is to maintain his claim that moral beliefs are fully determined.
